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Abstract 
Objectives To evaluate the implementation and adoption of the NHS 
detailed care records service in “early adopter” hospitals in England. 
Design Theoretically informed, longitudinal qualitative evaluation 
based on case studies. 
Setting 12 “early adopter” NHS acute hospitals and specialist care 
settings studied over two and a half years. 
Data sources Data were collected through in depth interviews, 
observations, and relevant documents relating directly to case study 
sites and to wider national developments that were perceived to impact 
on the implementation strategy. Data were thematically analysed, initially 
within and then across cases. The dataset consisted of 431 
semistructured interviews with key stakeholders, including hospital staff, 
developers, and governmental stakeholders; 590 hours of observations 
Correspondence to: A Sheikh aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk 
of strategic meetings and use of the software in context; 334 sets of 
notes from observations, researchers’ field notes, and notes from 
national conferences; 809 NHS documents; and 58 regional and 
national documents. 
Results Implementation has proceeded more slowly, with a narrower 
scope and substantially less clinical functionality than was originally 
planned. The national strategy had considerable local consequences 
(summarised under five key themes), and wider national developments 
impacted heavily on implementation and adoption. More specifically, 
delays related to unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of systems; 
the time needed to build, configure, and customise the software; the work 
needed to ensure that systems were supporting provision of care; and the 
needs of end users for training and support. Other factors hampering 
progress included the changing milieu of NHS policy and priorities; 
repeatedly renegotiated national contracts; different stages of 
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development of diverse NHS care records service systems; and a 
complex communication process between different stakeholders, 
along with contractual arrangements that largely excluded NHS 
providers. There was early evidence that deploying systems resulted 
in important learning within and between organisations and the 
development of relevant competencies within NHS hospitals. 
Conclusions Implementation of the NHS Care Records Service in 
“early adopter” sites proved time consuming and challenging, with as 
yet limited discernible benefits for clinicians and no clear advantages 
for patients. Although our results might not be directly transferable to 
later adopting sites because the functionalities we evaluated were new 
and untried in the English context, they shed light on the processes 
involved in implementing major new systems. The move to increased 
local decision making that we advocated based on our interim analysis 
has been pursued and welcomed by the NHS, but it is important that 
policymakers do not lose sight of the overall goal of an integrated 
interoperable solution. 
Introduction 
England’s National Programme for IT was, from its outset, an 
ambitious effort aiming to introduce national electronic health 
records across NHS care providers throughout the country (see 
appendix 1 on bmj.com).
1-6
 It is distinguished by its scale, 
unprecedented levels of investment, complexity of systems, 
centrally driven delivery model, and extremely challenging 
timelines.
7-10
 The English endeavour is one of the few sustained 
attempts to implement electronic health records—described by a 
recent Minister of Health as “the jewel in the crown of the 
NPfIT”—on a truly national scale.11 A brief history of the National 
Programme is given in appendix 2 on bmj.com. 
Building on our formative work in five acute and mental health 
hospitals,
12
 we present our summative findings from longitudinal 
qualitative work conducted over a longer period of time in a 
broader range of “early adopter” sites. We examined the local 
consequences of the centralised implementation and adoption 
strategy in the light of broader national developments to inform 
the ongoing implementation strategy. Findings from our related 
quantitative work will be reported in due course.
13
 Our work and 
the closely related evaluation of the summary care record systems 
are, we believe, the first attempts to prospectively study the 
implementation of electronic health record systems on a 
substantial scale.14 15This report is timely as the future direction 
of NHS IT—and specifically the NHS Care Records Service—is still 
highly uncertain. At the time of writing, the public accounts 
committee has published its updated assessment and the National 
Audit Office has published its third review of the National 
Programme for IT concluding that “progress with the delivery of 
care records systems continues to fall well below 
expectations.”16 17 A public consultation on future NHS IT policy 
in England has taken place, with an announcement on the 
ultimate outcome of the National Programme expected in late 
2011.
18
 
Methods 
Ethics and governance 
Our research was reviewed by an NHS ethics committee and 
classified as a service evaluation. We obtained informed consent 
from participating hospitals and individuals, while also 
complying with local governance requirements. All data were 
anonymised and care has been taken to ensure that the data 
presented here are neither attributable to participating sites 
nor to individuals to protect anonymity. 
Design 
We conducted a prospective longitudinal and real time evaluation 
of the introduction of the NHS Care Records Service in hospitals 
and specialist community care settings (henceforth referred to 
as hospitals) over a 30 month period from September 2008 to 
February 2011.
13
 We collected a broad range of qualitative data 
from “early adopter” hospitals committed to taking one of the 
three core software systems—Lorenzo Regional Care, Cerner 
Millennium, and RiO.
12
 We use the term “early adopter” in a broad 
sense to refer to hospitals that were among the first to receive 
these systems as part of the National Programme. Our evaluation 
drew on sociotechnical principles.
19
 The nature of sociotechnical 
evaluations has been discussed at length in our interim paper, 
but this in essence refers to the close and in some instances 
virtually inseparable relation between 
organisational/professional and technical considerations. Use of 
this theoretical approach helped to minimise the risk that we 
focused unduly (or indeed neglected) either the 
organisational/professional or technical dimensions of 
implementation efforts. 
We conceptualised participating hospitals as individual case 
study sites to reflect the importance of local contingencies, 
using this detailed understanding of local considerations as a 
platform from which to undertake a cross site synthesis and 
generate insights that could be transferable to other hospitals.
20-
23
 In doing so, we developed each case study in a way that allowed 
the specific character of the implementation and adoption of the 
software in each site to be revealed. This involved the analysis 
of data obtained from individual hospitals and writing of 
detailed individual case study reports describing local 
characteristics and developments over time. Data were collected 
and analysed without a constraining overarching framework, which 
enabled us to capture the diversity of experiences and the 
influence of the local environment on implementation efforts. 
Case studies were then considered in a cross case comparison to 
find common and contrasting themes between hospitals but also 
alternative and distinct experiences. Cross case comparisons were 
followed by integration with additional data obtained that did 
not directly relate to hospitals themselves but to the wider 
environment (such as policy documents, interviews with system 
developers, etc). 
Sampling 
Designated lead researchers were assigned to individual sites 
and were responsible for recruitment of hospitals and 
individual participants. We selected hospitals using purposive 
sampling to identify diverse organisations (teaching versus 
non-teaching; more autonomous versus less autonomous; and acute 
versus mental health settings) across the three geographical 
implementation areas (North Midlands and East, London, and 
Southern England) and the three centrally procured NHS Care 
Records Service applications (table⇓).24-26 This was achieved by 
drawing up a list of hospitals planning to implement different 
functionality during the course of our evaluation and using 
maximum variability sampling to identify sites to approach. 
Within each of the case studies, we purposefully recruited a 
diverse range of interviewees, actively seeking the broadest 
range of perspectives.27 28As case studies varied in relation to 
local arrangements and preferences, approaches to recruitment of 
participants were flexible, being negotiated with key contacts 
and gatekeepers at each hospital. 
Individual informants were initially recruited through 
recommendations of managers and, in some cases, also approached 
directly during site visits, based on recommendations 
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of previous interviewees. Our interviewees included junior and 
senior hospital managers, implementation team members and IT 
staff, junior and senior doctors and nurses, allied health 
professionals, administrative staff, and, when appropriate and 
possible, patients and carers. 
We also purposively sampled key stakeholders outside the 
immediate environment of implementation to understand the wider 
contextual landscape as this was found to play a more central 
role in influencing local implementation than we had originally 
envisaged.
29
 These informants were identified through our 
existing contacts within NHS Connecting for Health, approached 
at relevant national conferences, or approached directly based 
on recommendations from case study sites. These were 
individuals who had an active interest in the implementation 
and adoption of relevant systems, including civil servants, 
staff from NHS Connecting for Health, strategic health 
authorities, local service providers, system developers, and 
relevant independent sector representatives. 
Settings 
We initially collected data from 17 different locations, from 
which we identified 12 sites that satisfied our inclusion criteria 
for detailed case studies—that is, hospitals that had either begun 
implementing NHS Care Records Service software or were planning to 
do so during our evaluation period. These 12 sites therefore 
represented the focus of our efforts. 
Data collection and handling 
We conducted semistructured interviews with a range of key 
stakeholders and, in most cases, these were audio recorded and 
transcribed. Some interviews were not recorded, in keeping 
with participants’ wishes. Their concerns about being recorded 
possibly reflected the politically and commercially sensitive 
nature of the research environment (in such cases researchers 
took notes).
30-33
 Topic guides were tailored to interviewees’ 
roles and emerging issues but essentially these were designed 
to explore participants’ attitudes, challenges encountered, 
and proposed potential solutions to these. Sample topic guides 
can be viewed in appendix 3 on bmj.com. 
Interviews were complemented by researchers’ field notes 
describing experiences during data collection and noting down 
early findings, as well as observational and documentary data 
from hospitals, national documents, meetings with governmental 
stakeholders, and conferences. Observations were conducted in 
each case study site. This included researchers shadowing user 
related activities or strategic meetings, or both. Potentially 
relevant local and national documents were identified through 
various routes, including discussions with interviewees, 
contacts at NHS Connecting for Health, and proactive searches 
for relevant governmental, media, hospital, and academic 
reports. These documents were selected on the basis of providing 
an insight into contexts, planned changes relating to the 
implementation, and early lessons learnt. 
When possible and relevant, to trace changes over time, data 
collection at each hospital took place in two phases (time 1 and 
time 2) with a gap of six to nine months in between. In some 
cases, however, division into two phases was not possible or 
appropriate. Throughout the study, emerging qualitative findings 
were fed back to individual participating hospitals, NHS 
Connecting for Health, and our funders through formative 
feedback sessions.
12
 The discussions that ensued informed 
subsequent data collection and were taken into account in the 
final analysis. 
Data analysis 
Lead researchers (AR, AT, DP, KC, SC, TC, VL, and ZM) collected 
data in individual hospitals and also led on the thematic 
analysis of individual case studies.
20-23
 Regular analysis workshops 
with the wider team helped us to validate findings from 
individual case studies and to integrate multiple case studies to 
draw out transferable findings. Adopting a sequential or 
iterative analysis enabled us to refine questions, develop and 
challenge assumptions, and pursue emerging avenues of inquiry in 
later data gathering.21 34We continued data collection until 
saturation was reached (that is, no new rich diverse data 
relevant to the evaluation emerged for the duration we were in 
the field). This was partly influenced by factors related to the 
setting, such as the scale of the deployment at each site (for 
example, limited to a ward or hospital-wide) and type of 
functionalities being introduced (for example, software modules 
for ordering of clinical tests or clinical notes). 
In analysing data from case studies, we combined deductive 
thematic coding informed by sociotechnical principles
12
 and 
inductive coding that allowed themes to emerge from the data.19 26
This process involved immersion in the data, which was 
achieved by repeated reading of interview transcripts, 
discussion among team members, development of provisional 
analytic categories/themes informed by our theoretical lens 
and the wider literature, and iterative refinement of these 
categories using the constant comparative method (comparing 
our analysis with new data as these emerged). Our overall 
understanding of the implementation of systems was one that 
balanced the delivery of the technology (specific software 
functionality, computers, networks, databases, training 
manuals, etc) undertaken by the local service providers and 
software suppliers with the hospitals’ role of integrating 
this into their operations—what we termed adoption. To 
understand these adoption issues, analysis drew on notions of 
“working out” and “changing.”19 This approach helped with 
investigating the extended processes of change over time and 
the ways in which users of new systems and the organisations 
in which they were based worked out how to accommodate the 
technology into their work practices and the processes through 
which they delivered patients’ care. 
Results 
The table in appendix 4 on bmj.com provides a detailed profile 
of our case study sites. Our complete dataset comprised 431 
semistructured interviews, 590 hours of observations, 234 sets 
of notes from observations, researcher field notes, and 
conferences, 809 NHS documents, and 58 national and regional 
documents. 
The interviews were conducted with healthcare professionals 
(41%); hospital managers and administrative staff (26%); 
hospital based IT implementation leads (18%); staff from NHS 
Connecting for Health (8%); local service provider staff 
(2%); patients and carers (2%); and a range of other relevant 
stakeholders (3%). 
Our longitudinal approach allowed us to differentiate between 
more isolated transitory challenges and those that were more 
overarching or persistent, or both. We were therefore able, for 
example, to understand how local deployments in sites were 
influenced by wider contextual factors, the impact of which 
intensified over the period of our evaluation (summarised in box 
1). We also developed a detailed understanding of the local 
challenges of implementation of NHS Care Records Service systems 
and the range of consequences that followed. Depending on the 
system in question (described in more detail in box 2), 
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and often heavily influenced by organisational history and 
developments over time, consequences were identified relating 
to individual work practices and organisational functioning. 
As each implementation was different—different organisations, of 
different sizes in different geographical areas, and with different 
legacy software systems, IT infrastructures, skill mixes, employee 
relations, work processes, histories, visions for change and 
technology deployed—some findings (unsurprisingly) varied across 
sites (see appendix 4 on bmj.com). As a result, there were distinct 
stories of local working out (see box 3 for these in relation to 
different systems). These detailed stories will be reported in more 
detail in due course, but in this paper we focus on the more 
overarching themes identified across sites. 
Some aspects of our findings confirmed and strengthened the 
themes reported in our interim paper and are also in line with 
previous findings from the literature.1 14 15 29 35-83 Rather than 
reiterate these confirmatory themes here, we have focused on 
several novel findings, particularly those of national and 
international interest. We present these, illustrated by data 
that have been selected on the basis of representativeness and 
descriptive power.
13
 Further supporting data are available on 
request from the corresponding author. Our findings are 
organised along the two key themes (with other themes and 
subthemes detailed in box 4): local consequences of the national 
strategy and the national implementation landscape. 
Local consequences of the national strategy 
Implementing NHS Care Records Service systems on a national 
scale was an extremely complex activity, with the potential to 
impact on large numbers of clinical, managerial, and 
administrative staff with different needs, expectations, and 
experiences. During this process, staff had to learn and work 
out the consequences of such systems day by day, and this 
learning is likely to continue for many years to come as further 
functionalities are introduced and as the systems become 
integrated within the often taken for granted practices of the 
hospital. 
Multiple translations of the vision 
Within our case study sites, we found that there were many 
different translations of the overall vision of NHS Care Records 
Service systems among various stakeholders. These ranged from 
those that focused on managing patients’ data (such as data 
capture, storage, and sharing) to changing organisational 
arrangements and workflows (such as business process change) to 
more policy related aims (such as modernisation, shift to patient 
focus). For example, some held a business driven view that 
emphasised standardised practice at the expense of innovation in 
workflow, clinical practice, interorganisational arrangements, or 
management and policy ambitions: 
“Ideal is that the NHS will become standardised, so 
the way in which we interact with computers and the 
way in which we interact with patients will become 
standardised” (interview, IT professional, site C). 
Such views clashed with those who saw electronic health records 
as being a way to achieve more patient centred healthcare: 
“it’s the patients that hold the record and the patient 
should control who has access to it . . . Give the patient 
the record and give the patient the key to unlock it. They 
are partly responsible for the record themselves” 
(interview, healthcare professional, site R). 
We found little evidence of efforts to align these perspectives 
to aid the process of working towards agreed goals. The 
persistence of multiple visions thus possibly reflected limited 
or ineffective communication channels to maintain or indeed 
refine or update the original vision. 
The arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in 
institutional settings 
Various approaches were taken by local organisations to prepare 
for implementation, and several internal and external factors 
shaped the different implementation strategies pursued. These 
included different levels of maturity of NHS Care Records 
Service systems, concurrent changes occurring in sites (for 
example, working to achieve greater autonomy from the Department 
of Health), changes in the National Programme as a whole (for 
example, contract renegotiations), and in NHS policies and 
targets (for example, financial savings and restructuring of 
commissioning models), all adding uncertainties and delays to 
the process. 
“I think people get a bit, is it worth it? Is it worth 
me continuing? Should I put the effort in?” (interview, 
IT professional, site C). 
Most of the hospitals we studied were “early adopters.” This 
meant that all concerned (that is, NHS Connecting for Health, 
suppliers, local service providers, and hospitals) were 
encountering problems for the first time. These often involved 
the challenges inherent in putting software into practice and 
related problems with connectivity, usability, training, data 
quality and migration, and system downtime. 
The complex supply chains and convoluted communication 
processes between hospitals, local service providers, software 
suppliers, and NHS Connecting for Health that we previously 
described, persisted over time.
38
 The tensions relating to 
contracts often led to a rigid focus on a limited set of 
“deliverables,” thereby hindering any attempts at fostering 
local ownership or meaningful engagement with NHS staff. There 
was consequently a lack of attention to more productive 
deliberations that might have helped to overcome the many 
challenges that were (inevitably) encountered. Hospitals, as 
the “client” or “problem owner,” were hampered by a lack of 
budgetary control, lack of information about contractual 
arrangements, and lack of ability to configure the software 
(constrained by contractual clauses). Nor could they 
effectively engage in direct communication with the software 
supplier. The primacy of these commercial relationships often 
meant that participants suggested that contracts were focused 
on the delivery of the product rather than on its quality, the 
process of delivery, achieving meaningful use, and wider 
consequences of its implementation: 
“I think it’s always very difficult when you involve a 
commercial company with a public service, because a 
commercial company will always be driven by profit and 
the money that they are making. Maybe as things get 
critical the quality of what’s delivered becomes a 
secondary issue” (interview, healthcare professional, 
site C). 
This led at times to a gradual disengagement by hospital 
staff. Also contributing to disengagement was the 
communications cycle between user and developer that was often 
extended and fragmented. The potential for imaginative or 
pragmatic problem solving furthermore clashed with the “top 
down” approach governed by software contracts and formal 
processes of requirement specification. 
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Box 1: Continuing and intensified impact of external context on local deployments—key emerging 
issues Contractual tensions 
 Perceived to inhibit local choice and decision making, with these arrangements becoming more complex and far 
reaching as time progressed 
 Resulting in an increasingly strained relationship between stakeholders, slowly eroding good will on all parts and inhibiting 
progress Media portrayal and impact 
 Perceived to have contributed considerably to a negative public perception of the National Programme as a whole by an 
unremitting focus on negative aspects such as delays, costs, and problems occurring during implementations 
 Some implementations were played out in the press as exemplar sites, with their success assumed to either “make or 
break” the National Programme as a whole and associated software systems, local service providers, and developers 
Box 2: Three national electronic health record systems implemented as part of National Programme 
Cerner Millennium 
 Commercial “off the shelf” software supplied by Cerner, developed in the United States and provided by BT 
 Offered to secondary healthcare settings in London and the South of England 
 Had to be configured to English healthcare settings 
 Initially sites had limited customisability but more choice to adjust functionalities was given in 2010 under the “New Delivery Model” 
 Planned to be delivered in four different sequential releases that built on each other with progressively richer functionalities 
 Hospitals followed a “big bang” approach to implementations 
 By December 2010 Cerner Millennium was live in six out of 32 acute hospitals in London and in nine out of 40 acute 
hospitals in the South of England 
RiO 
 Commercial “off the shelf” web based software developed in the United Kingdom by CSE Healthcare (formerly CSE-Servelec) 
 Provided by BT to mental health hospitals, community organisations, and primary care settings 
 Offered to sites in London and the South of England 
 RiO was planned to be deployed in four waves starting with version 4.0 or 5.0 and ending with version 7 
 Problems encountered during upgrades from version 4.0 to 5.1 led to temporary suspension of deployments, which resumed by 2010 
 Configured to meet the individual needs of mental health settings 
 By December 2010, RiO was live in 17/45 community and mental health hospitals in the South, in 8/10 mental health 
hospitals, and in 30/31 primary care settings in London 
Lorenzo Regional Care 
 Web based software solution offered to hospitals located in North, Midlands, and East of England 
 Supplied by iSOFT, developed in India and provided by CSC Alliance 
 Not “off the shelf,” but a growing product intended to be developed in line with requirements of hospitals 
 Implementation of Lorenzo Regional Care was stepwise (paper and computer systems were gradually replaced with 
electronic systems in selected parts of hospitals initially) 
 Supplied in four different releases with increasing functionality 
 Common characteristic of all implementations was the small scale and scope 
 By December 2010, limited Lorenzo Regional Care functionality was implemented in one mental health hospital, two 
community hospitals, and three acute hospitals 
 
“The milestones in the plan were set as a contractual 
milestone so we weren’t allowed to alter those. What 
was quite difficult was we had to work backwards from 
those milestones. . . milestones that were set were 
probably going to be unachievable, but we had to work 
within the constraints of that contract” (interview, 
IT professional, site R). 
“it takes much longer to do anything than you think it’s 
going to take and there’s so many people involved, so 
many committees involved to get anything done at the 
supply side that it takes a long time to get things 
sorted and that’s unfortunate” (interview, IT 
professional, site H). 
Standardisation versus localisation 
All sites adopting the software systems faced trade-offs between 
standardisation and localisation. Administrative, technical, and 
clinical users interviewed were often aware of this tension and 
of the need to balance the requirements of individual 
organisations and the NHS more generally. Thus, some were 
concerned that the more customised the software became the more 
distant it would get from its centrally defined purposes: 
“If you keep giving people the ability to localise 
things you kind of drive away from a centralised 
understanding” (interview, healthcare professional, 
site C). 
Assumptions inscribed into NHS Care Records Service systems as 
to how the English NHS operated (or should operate) were often 
challenged. The system was often perceived by hospital staff to 
reflect developers’ lack of understanding of their clinical 
processes, resulting in systems that were often seen as linear 
and homogeneous, and unable to fit to the actual complexities of 
clinical practice: 
“What was delivered was a clumsy system that seems 
to have been designed for one clinician who has 
clinics booked up in advance that uniquely come in 
and everybody who comes shows up or maybe they don’t 
BMJ 2011;343:d6054 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6054 Page 5 of 14 
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe 
  
RESEARCH 
 
Box 3: Three national electronic health record systems and different ways of working them out 
Cerner Millennium 
 Hospitals could tailor Cerner Millennium to their respective settings within the constraints of the contract 
 Cerner Millennium sites initially required a rewriting of the patient administration system and then made adjustments to the final product 
 During configuration Cerner Millennium was tested and any issues that were raised were prioritised by the hospitals before 
being reported to the local service provider to be fixed 
 The New Delivery Model allowed hospitals to configure the product to their needs. Co-location was perceived as an important factor 
for accomplishing joined up configuration, avoiding bottlenecks in the supply chain and dealing with failures directly. This process 
also gave sites a sense of control over configuration, though the local service provider would still play an active role by mediating 
between hospitals and Cerner 
 One hospital implemented a version of Cerner Millennium configured by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre with a view to 
anglicising the software so that it represented their clinical pathways and reflected their lines of accountability and hierarchy 
RiO 
 Hospitals could tailor RiO to their respective settings within the constraints of the contract 
 Some argued that RiO did initially not support reporting on performance adequately and thus brought in people to help 
develop this functionality 
 RiO was implemented across all mental health hospitals in London, bringing several benefits 
Lorenzo Regional Care 
 Lorenzo Regional Care had to be substantially developed and redesigned by sites to meet their needs and support clinical processes 
 Sites would get new builds of the system on a regular basis in the testing environment before they went to the live environment. 
During this process they collected any issues, which were then prioritised, being kept by each site in a log and managed in 
collaboration with the government and local service providers. These issues would be reported to the Computer Sciences 
Corporation, which would then report them to iSOFT to be fixed 
 To facilitate the process, some project team members travelled to Chennai and worked together with the developers. iSOFT and the 
local service provider set up regular web-conference meetings with sites during which the software was demonstrated from Chennai 
and sites were able to comment and provide feedback before any change was made to the code 
 Lorenzo Regional Care was, since the point of its adoption, under continuous development, which adversely impacted on 
hospitals’ ability to plan for anticipated changes 
 Despite the fact that Lorenzo Regional Care was one system, its design and functionalities were different in the different 
settings. While the few healthcare professionals who used Lorenzo Regional Care made it work for them and were happy 
with the system, other users continued to experience frustrations 
show up. There is nothing more complicated than that” 
(interview, healthcare professional, site M). 
The complex supply chains added tortuous bottlenecks in 
resolving such issues. In line with this, some participants 
reported that the software they were implementing was 
“inflexible,” that they “had to push hard for every single 
change in the system,” and that “finding solutions seemed to be 
long winded and difficult” (interview, healthcare professional, 
site R). 
Some early benefits for staff 
The challenging experiences described above did not 
necessarily invalidate the case for electronic health records. 
Enhanced availability of data and data management tools were 
perceived as benefits by managers and some clinical users when 
information was legible, available in “real time,” more easily 
searchable and retrievable (such as for management purposes), 
and accessible “any time” and “anywhere” by multiple 
concurrent users. The team working that exemplifies community 
mental health provided an example of where sharing of data 
brought clear benefits. 
“The main thing really is that we can read people’s 
writing. That was a big thing before that you couldn’t 
actually read what people were writing in the NHS 
across the board. Now we can read everybody’s writing. 
That is a major thing. And people I think forget that 
over time. You quickly forget the bad old days of not 
being able to read what somebody has written” 
(interview, healthcare professional, site M). 
“It’s good for performance management as well, so you 
can go back to clinicians and go OK never mind how 
many patients you saw, this is your risk level of your 
caseload, this is the risk level of somebody else’s 
caseload, look at the difference? Why do you think that 
might be, and you can also look at numbers, you know, 
this is the number of letters that you’ve sent to GPs 
[general practitioners] how come so and so sends this 
many letters and you only do this many letters, you 
know, because you’ve got absolutely everything there” 
(interview, IT professional, site H). 
These positive developments really materialised only after a 
system had achieved a critical mass of users and data. Initially, 
there was often seen to be a need to “feed the beast” (interview, 
healthcare professional, site H), getting little, if anything, in 
return. 
Electronic transmission of information was also reported as 
making some user workflows faster overall, although individual 
stages of these workflows could become more time consuming than 
the previous system—this was, for example, the case if the data 
input screen required additional or different data from those 
that were customarily recorded. In such cases, staff often 
understood that the extra investment of time on their part 
served an important wider organisational function, but in the 
context of already heavy clinical or administrative workloads 
investing this additional time still often rankled. 
More generally, our data, drawn from multiple user and 
managerial communities across sites, suggested that the upheaval 
associated with implementing these systems had given the 
opportunity for organisational learning and reflection. Staff 
were often engaged with the problem of getting the best out of 
the new system and in exploring its possibilities. As one IT 
professional stated: 
“There are a lot of experienced people now that 
understand what this type of change means to the NHS 
and how to help them to make that happen that I think 
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Box 4: New emerging themes and subthemes: local consequences of implementation of NHS Care 
Records Service systems 
Translations of the vision 
 The NHS Care Records Service as a multifaceted concept embedding various visions 
The arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in institutional settings 
 Ways in which hospitals prepared themselves for the NHS Care Records Service 
Hospitals had different characteristics and varied histories, but reasons for being an “early adopter” were often similar 
Management and technical infrastructures varied substantially 
Approaches and methodologies for implementation strategies varied across hospitals 
Each hospital organised its own training to tailor the service to the local systems and the needs 
of users Sufficient resources were necessary for the timely implementation of the NHS Care Records 
Service 
 Concerns related to the arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in institutional 
settings Delays in organisational readiness because of differentiation within each hospital 
Parallel running of other initiatives and 
projects Implementation dissociated from actual 
practice Complex supply and management chain 
Changing NHS policies 
 Implementation as a process 
Made to work through the mediation of several people and technologies 
Distinction between implementation and adoption was blurred 
The software systems were being put into use, used, and adapted and back to being “implemented”—a cyclical process of growth 
Standardisation versus localisation 
 Different software systems were modified in different ways 
 Concerns included: standardisation versus localisation, lack of knowledge about the product, the English NHS, and clinical work 
 Complex supply chains 
 Involvement of commercial organisations 
Some early benefits for staff 
 Enhanced availability of data and data management tools 
 Multidisciplinary teams sharing a patient’s care on site or across sites, transfers of care especially with 
referrals/discharges or requests for investigations/reports 
 Learning that had taken place 
Learning about managing and implementing large scale IT led organisational change projects 
Learning to use IT to support organisational and 
healthcare goals Work processes and changes in work practices 
 Changes to clinical and administrative work processes for 
patient care Various users and reasons to use the systems 
Processes of adaptation, compensating, 
workarounds Changes to sequencing in recording 
clinical notes Redistribution of work and time for patient 
care Flexibility and mobility of work 
Quality of work life 
 Professional identity, peer relations, and engagement with the technology 
 Changes to local management processes 
 Managing with real 
time data Making work visible 
Overall developments in the face of continuing political, economic, and policy uncertainty 
 Implementation progress has been slow 
 Shifting political and economic climate and progressive move from the initial “top down” implementation model to an 
increase in local involvement in decision making 
 Lack of sustained leadership and lack of certainty for hospitals yet to implement 
 Danger that work invested will not be utilised 
 Risk of reverting back to patchy implementations of the main patient administration systems with limited clinical 
functionality and poor interoperability 
you wouldn’t want to lose that” (interview, IT 
professional, site D). 
Work processes and changes in work practices 
We found that the NHS Care Records Service was usually portrayed 
by planners and implementers as a set of systems designed 
primarily for clinical users, but that the main users of 
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to be elicited, understood, or acted on as implementations 
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I bothered to come into work, you would come in 
before and you would think well I’ve got three 
clinics there that day and you’re just thinking well 
I knew I could get three of them typed you’re lucky 
now if you can get one typed in a day. I said at one 
of the meetings well when are you going to start 
employing some extra staff if you want the work done 
instead of cutting back on us, which is what they’re 
doing because now with the system work’s just all 
piled up and they’re just giving us a system, we 
don’t have any cover, work piled up for two weeks, 
and the system is taking two or three times as long” 
(interview, administrative staff, site B). 
Senior clinicians were often (particularly in the early stages of 
the implementation) less likely to be affected directly by the 
system on a daily basis than their more junior colleagues (though 
this to an extent depended on the system in question and the 
specialty). For instance, a consultant psychiatrist explained that 
junior doctors would type clinical information into the electronic 
health record on their behalf: 
“I have a team. I probably use [RiO] less than 10% of 
the time, because if I’m seeing patients in a ward 
setting, it would be my junior doctor that’s 
inputting the information” (interview, healthcare 
professional, site M). 
Over time, the software systems were, in most cases, made to work 
better and more in synchrony with the local practices of delivery 
of care. Users, despite the problems they faced, were with effort 
able to “reconfigure” the software or reconfigure their way of 
working. In this way, their early frustrations were in some cases 
reduced. Thus a process of adaptation and adoption into the 
complex settings in which the software systems were implemented 
occurred. If this adjustment process was not possible, however, 
staff were obliged to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the 
technology (for example, by using other systems, adopting 
compensating behaviours, or by partial use). Getting to know the 
limits of the system, users learnt to prepare and compensate. In 
doing so, they “creatively” devised strategies to overcome 
usability issues, such as taking screenshots of the just typed 
notes when the system “froze” and then printing it to add it to 
the paper file to avoid having to re-do time consuming work. This 
also, for example, involved leaving identity 
authentication cards in computer terminals to avoid lengthy 
log-in processes, as illustrated by the following 
researcher observation note: 
10.45am: Student is now seeing a patient (old lady) in 
cubicle 1, chatting “How are you today? How are you 
getting on with your cream? Are you diabetic? Do you 
have thyroid problems?”; the system is still running 
on the laptop and the SmartCard [an identity 
authentication card] is in it while [the healthcare 
professional] is still out of the room. 
The need to “trick the system” to overcome constraints (such as 
mandated fields or screens unfit for a specific clinical 
activity) and to “get the job done” or absence of the right 
clinical code in a drop down menu could result in issues further 
down the line—for instance, impacting on data quality or 
management’s ability to monitor activity levels. 
Systems also led to a redistribution of work, with in some cases, 
clinicians doing more of the data entry that would otherwise be 
done by “typists” or “data entry” clerks. As a result, some 
participants reported that constant use of computers was “not 
really what [they] signed up for,” and other interviewees argued 
that NHS Care Records Service software was undermining their 
professional standing by forcing them to undertake 
administrative tasks: 
“Especially when it started for the first few months it 
was very much, we felt like IT people, we felt like 
admin people instead of actual clinicians because we 
were spending more time with this system than we were 
actually with the patient” (interview, healthcare 
professional, site H). 
This was exacerbated when data entry on the computer took (or 
seemed to take) longer than on paper, which put additional 
pressure on users: 
“All our doctors and nurses are having to work harder 
now, because we are having to see the same number of 
patients with less time, because you are spending 
more time on a computer now and we have got no more 
doctor or nursing resources to do that” 
(interview, healthcare professional, site D). 
Overall, work practices did not become “paperless” or even 
“paper light”: note taking while with the patient was still 
most often done on paper—sometimes on the back of scraps of 
used paper—with data entry to the computer systems done 
retrospectively (though this depended again on the maturity of 
the system in question). A major change in work practices 
expected by many at the outset, indeed a part of the vision, 
was concurrent entry of clinical information on the system at 
the time the activity took place (such as when consulting with 
a patient). For instance, in one hospital, the intention of 
management was for: 
“Staff to update the record in real-time, so that the 
NHS Care Records Service became accepted as a normal 
part of their work” (interview, IT professional, site 
D). 
In most hospitals, however, clinicians did not enter data in the 
system while they were with the patients (either at bedside, 
during ward rounds, or during outpatient clinics). This changed 
to some extent over time and varied between settings, but the 
example of mental health patients presenting in emergency 
departments (which had target times within which all patients 
needed to be seen) was particularly telling: 
“I think there is a big issue for junior doctors out of 
hours and the nightshift in accident and emergency 
because the psychiatric assessments are quite lengthy 
and there is quite a lot of notes that go with it. What 
they usually do while they are in with the patient is, 
they make the notes as they go along and they are the 
record. They’ve raised concerns that they will be in 
with the patient and they are then going to have to come 
and type those notes up. They are not going to be able 
to do it while they are with the patient, because of 
issues like risk. These are patients that are really 
quite disturbed. You can’t kind of be faffing around 
getting them by computers. So it’s going to increase the 
time spent and you are then delayed seeing the next 
patient, that’s going to impact on the breaches of 
accident and emergency which is I think the big anxiety” 
(interview, healthcare professional, site M). 
The national implementation landscape 
Overall, progress with implementing the NHS Care Records 
Service has been much slower than anticipated, with little 
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implementation of clinical applications. As of December 
2010—by which time the implementation should have been 
completed
10—8/219 hospitals (4%) were live with limited 
Lorenzo Regional Care functionality in the North Midlands 
and Eastern area of England; in the South 17/45 (38%) 
community and mental health hospitals were live with RiO and 
9/40 acute hospitals (23%) were live with Cerner Millennium; 
and in London 6/32 acute hospitals (19%) were live with 
Cerner Millennium software, while RiO was being used by 8/10 
(80%) mental health hospitals and 30/31 primary care 
settings (97%). Altogether, of the 377 sites in which 
implementation should have taken place, 78 (21%) had begun 
the process of implementing a variant of the NHS Care 
Records Service. It should, however, be noted that the 
figures for implementation of the NHS Care Records Service 
slightly underestimate the level of computerisation of the 
patient record across England as a few hospitals do have 
substantial systems outside of the National Programme. 
We found that the changing political and economic climate—
specifically the change in government and the economic 
recession—resulted in uncertainty about the future of the 
National Programme. There was in particular a substantive move 
away from the initial “top-down” implementation model to an 
increase in local involvement in decision making, particularly 
in London and the Southern areas.
12
 For example, as one 
national media report noted: 
“BT’s new agreement with the Department of Health 
may provide a better indication of the Programme’s 
future. The company, which met the deadline it was 
set to implement Cerner Millennium at Kingston 
Hospital last year, agreed to cut £112m (11%) from 
its £996m local service provider contract to the NHS 
in London. It will do so by abandoning the idea of 
uniform software: if London hospital trusts [that is, 
hospitals] already have fit-for-purpose IT, BT will 
connect those systems rather than replace them.”84 
These changes were, at the time of writing, ongoing, with the 
coalition government still not having published a detailed IT 
strategy for the NHS. The initial indications were that the 
future of the National Programme was likely to be characterised 
by increased local input in decision making and an opening up of 
the supplier market, thereby allowing greater supplier choice.18 85
This should be contrasted with the originally planned NHS Care 
Records Service, which, as noted above, aimed to deliver an 
integrated standardised solution. 
Locally, we witnessed several major impacts of these wider 
developments. The resulting lack of sustained leadership from 
the centre rendered it difficult for the hospitals to develop 
any coherent long term strategy. There were serious concerns 
by hospitals that had already begun implementing NHS Care 
Records Service systems such as Lorenzo Regional Care but with 
only limited clinical functionality: 
“I cannot see how that’s ever going to succeed, I just 
can’t and as you quite rightly say you’ve got bits of 
functionality implemented in very small areas. You’ve 
got bits of functionality implemented in podiatry or 
somewhere else but you’re not seeing the rollout of 
that functionality to the rest of an organisation and 
how on earth are you going to progress if they’re not 
doing that so, you know, you’re going to have, you 
know, isolated developments in isolated areas in an 
organisation and that’s not what the NHS needs, you 
know, it needs things that are optimising things across 
organisations” (interview, independent sector). 
These concerns extended to questions about the likely “life 
span” and degree of continuing support for these nationally 
procured systems (as contracts with local service providers are 
scheduled to end in 2015) and potential consequences to local 
morale if efforts to implement were to be “abandoned” in the 
current austerity climate. Most thought that the considerable 
work invested in making these systems work and the local 
expertise gained in the process should not be allowed to wither 
but were nonetheless unclear as to what direction they should 
take. 
There were no coherent plans for the many hospitals yet to 
implement these systems, leaving some organisations to consider 
alternative options. Our work indicated that this was especially 
apparent in the more autonomous hospitals. 
“[name] was pretty plain until quite recently that 
any [hospital] that broke away from the National 
Programme would be penalised even if, you know, the 
guidance says that, you know, [more autonomous 
hospitals] don’t have to adopt national solutions so 
I think there was a lot of management pressure to 
keep [more autonomous hospitals] in the loop” 
(interview, independent sector). 
The over-riding related concern expressed by several mangers 
was that the move away from the original goals of the National 
Programme and in particular the NHS Care Records Service—
without any parallel focus on ensuring interoperability and 
shared learning—would risk reverting the NHS back to the same 
situation that led to the creation of the National Programme—
namely, patchy implementations of the main patient 
administration systems with limited clinical functionality and 
poor interoperability. 
“Well strangely enough of course, you know, going 
back 20-30 years OK the technology was very 
different but, you know, there were custom-built NHS 
solutions so [name of hospital] went through a custom-
built approach but what was found was I think it might 
have worked at [name of hospital] but they could never 
really get it to work anywhere else.. . So I think 
decisions were taken in setting up the National 
Programme which didn’t take enough account of what had 
happened in the past, there was a view, you know, 
which was well you guys who’ve been working in 
this space up till now have failed, you haven’t 
delivered what was needed so here we are with a 
fresh new broom and Richard Granger was very much on 
record as saying, you know, we’re going to clear, 
we’re going to start afresh and the National 
Programme is about rip and replace and, you know, 
in hindsight that was probably the wrong approach” 
(interview, independent sector). 
Discussion 
Main findings 
Implementation of NHS Care Records Service systems has 
proceeded much more slowly than expected and with as yet 
limited benefits for NHS staff or patients. Delays seemed to be 
caused by the complex and constantly shifting national set-up 
characterised by complex politically shaped contractual 
relationships that largely excluded NHS healthcare providers. 
Many stakeholders had a lack of appreciation of the social and 
organisational consequences of implementing technology and 
unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of the software 
systems; the time needed to build, configure, and customise the 
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software; the work needed to ensure that these systems were 
supporting rather than hindering provision of care; and the 
training and support needs of end users (and particularly non-
clinical staff). The local consequences for organisations 
implementing different functionalities were considerable in 
terms of time and efforts it took to “work out” the new 
technology and cost implications. Across hospitals, however, 
we found that some benefits emerged overtime, mainly relating 
to organisational learning and improved local data sharing. 
Strengths and limitations of this work 
The scale, volume of data obtained, and real time nature of this 
evaluation of the implementation of electronic health records in 
English secondary healthcare settings are strengths of our work.
1
 
We also used a methodologically innovative design,
86
 captured 
contemporaneous multifaceted real time longitudinal data, and had 
theoretical grounding.19 87As a result we obtained a rich and 
nuanced appreciation of the implementation and adoption of the 
NHS Care Records Service locally, the depth of inquiry offering 
transferability beyond the immediate context of this evaluation 
as we sampled from a range of hospitals, software systems, and 
stakeholders.19 8This depth of inquiry and the richness of the 
ensuing dataset enabled us to consider a range of explanatory 
factors. For example, we considered both generational and skills-
related factors to explain the problems encountered by healthcare 
professionals, and, while there was some evidence of these being 
important in a few instances, they did not emerge as major in 
explaining the lack of progress with implementation and adoption 
to date. This diversity of context and data is, we believe, a 
strength, particularly in the study of electronic health records, 
where much reported research relates to a single site, often a 
well resourced centre of excellence.
48
 
This work also has several limitations. In working with the 
“early adopters” we observed problems that were being dealt with 
for the first time by all stakeholders; these might eventually 
be resolved through negotiation, and subsequent implementers 
could learn from these early experiences. Studying “early 
adopters” could be viewed as a worst case scenario. That said, 
these sites were selected (sometimes after competition) on the 
basis of their previous track record of implementing IT and the 
leadership capacity, or both, within the organisation, and they 
often received considerable financial and technical support of 
an order that is unlikely to be offered to later adopters. In 
some respects these can therefore be seen as best case 
scenarios. Judging the balance between these two positions comes 
down in part to the notion of the perfectibility of the 
technical elements. If “early adopters” “iron out the wrinkles” 
and refined technology is inherently more acceptable and usable, 
then things should get better. But on balance we are not 
convinced by this argument as the more fundamental and 
challenging issue is organisational change, not technical 
refinement. The key point is that it is important to extrapolate 
with caution from our work on “early adopters” to later adopting 
sites. Our focus was on investigating issues and emergent 
changes in early implementation processes as opposed to 
systematically identifying benefits (though we did search 
extensively for these during our work) such as those outlined in 
appendix 1 on bmj.com. Benefits of implementing a national IT 
based health records system might not be seen for several years 
as there is a natural learning curve in any organisational 
change initiative, highlighting the need for longer term 
longitudinal mixed methods work. 
Another important issue has been gatekeeper influence at all 
levels, possibly because of conflicting priorities, but possibly 
also the, at times politically charged, nature of the 
implementation of NHS Care Records Service, which has been the 
subject of major sustained parliamentary, political, and media 
scrutiny, both in the UK and internationally.10 89-7The latest wave 
of this scrutiny has been triggered by a National Audit Office 
report, which concluded that “given its past history, the major 
issues still confronting the care records systems, and with such 
significant funds still at stake, there is a compelling case for 
the recently announced Whitehall-wide review to re-evaluate the 
business case for the Programme to determine what should happen 
now to safeguard against further loss of public value.”16 17This 
political environment resulted in restricted access to some 
stakeholders, including patients, developers, governmental 
stakeholders, and healthcare professionals. It also meant that 
some stakeholders initially seemed to hesitate in providing us 
with information, particularly in relation to what they 
considered to be sensitive (and sometimes confidential). 
Nevertheless, the longitudinal nature of the evaluation helped 
in building trust and facilitating more open discussion, 
particularly with members of NHS Connecting for Health. 
Similarly, information relating to the actual “go live” dates of 
hospitals was difficult to obtain, impacting on our sampling 
strategy and ability to plan. 
Finally, our formative work might have had an impact on the 
findings from our summative research, and this could therefore 
be seen by some as a limitation. We, however, view this as a 
strength as it provided an opportunity to share with hospitals 
any early lessons learnt.
98
 
Policy implications for the NHS 
Policymakers have already started to shift the focus to more 
local efforts to procure and implement electronic health 
records, these being reinforced by the changes in outlook of 
the coalition government, the planned changes to the NHS in 
England (such as a drive to increasing the autonomy of 
hospitals from the control of central government), and the 
current economic climate.12 18 85 In the light of this evolving 
policy landscape, and drawing on our research and broader 
international experiences, we have summarised our main 
recommendations in box 5. A particularly urgent short term 
measure is to make the software work well in the NHS 
organisations that have already started implementation. 
While welcomed by many NHS hospitals, the move to a more locally 
driven approach might also mean some major trade offs. These 
include the risk of potentially conflicting local priorities 
resulting in insufficient drive and funding for such 
developments, problems with systems interoperability, and failure 
to share lessons learnt with consequent entrenchment of local 
work practices rather than the original vision to “transform” 
healthcare nationally. Furthermore, not all hospitals will have 
the expertise to implement such transformative IT initiatives, 
which in turn could result in unacceptable risks to the safety 
and quality of care. There is also the danger of double counting 
potential efficiency gains as those included in the business case 
for IT implementations overlap with those included in other local 
cost reduction initiatives. 
Implications for the international community 
The English experience offers several potentially transferable 
lessons for ongoing international efforts to implement electronic 
health records.
99-104
 First and foremost, there remain important drivers 
for the implementation of integrated electronic health records, 
including the potential for increased accessibility, which is 
important considering the more fragmented nature of provision of 
care and the major advantages associated with digitised data 
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Box 5: Summary of emerging key policy recommendations 
Overall strategy 
 Build on a coherent vision of shared electronic health records to improve the provision of joined up patient centred care 
 Devise a strategy that is characterised by flexibility and the ability to respond to evolving needs, while ensuring 
that there is a clear local rationale aligned with national purposes 
 Move away from technology driven models of implementation and refocus attention on adoption as ongoing 
“working out” between staff and technology; think of technology as an enabler of improved care processes rather than an 
end in itself 
Architecture 
 Ensure that software is assessed to be fit for purpose by users in the implementing organisations 
Process 
 Make software work well in the NHS organisations that have already started implementation 
 Ensure that procurement decisions are not based on unrealistic assumptions of achieving cost savings or even 
short term returns on investment, but rather on introducing clinical functionality early so that these systems are used 
 Balance central incentives to implement with large scale interoperability and local input in decision making 
 Ensure sustained efforts and appropriate funding characterised by a coherent strategy with realistic timelines to 
allow local organisations time to “work out” the consequences of the change 
 Consider the merits of participating in the development of open source systems as opposed to the purchase of 
commercially developed systems 
 Retain hard won knowledge at both local and national levels and make appropriate use of these skills and 
expertise both in and across sites 
 Facilitate the sharing of experience and learning both nationally and internationally 
in relation to facilitating quality improvement initiatives and 
research. 
As we have shown, the procurement of national systems in England 
had a range of unanticipated consequences. Large scale 
procurement was undertaken to save costs, but this meant that 
implementation timelines were rushed, being driven according to 
political timeframes in line with procurement arrangements. 
Hospitals have coped differently with these pressures, often 
heavily influenced by the particular type of software 
implemented. Despite the important learning within and between 
organisations that had taken place across the sites we studied, 
these national pressures have, in some cases, resulted in 
software being deployed prematurely with adverse consequences for 
local organisations, users, and patients’ care. We therefore 
recommend that procurement decisions should not be based on 
unrealistic assumptions of achieving cost savings or even short 
term returns on investment, but rather on introducing clinical 
and associated decision support functionality early so that these 
systems are used and deliver demonstrable clinical benefits.103 105 
Adequate national investments also need to be made to support 
interoperability, which is fundamental to enabling reuse of 
data.
103
 Recent announcements in the English strategy, however, 
indicate that only 2% of the total IT modernisation budget has 
been allocated to support interoperability.
16
 
Strategically, it is essential that any health informatics policy 
is integrated with concurrent policy initiatives and reflects the 
dynamic environment in which it is taking place. In England, this 
has to some extent been achieved (such as by gradual movement 
towards a more localised approach), while on the other hand it was 
(and still is) hard to adapt nationally set arrangements to 
evolving needs (such as contracts with local service providers). 
The consequences of these are often still hard felt on the ground. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to achieve this balance as healthcare 
organisations are continually changing. For example, the 
increasing competition among healthcare organisations might not 
align with delivering the benefits of shared learning, nor with 
prioritising efforts to ensure large-scale interoperability.
18
 The 
recent National Audit Office report highlights current 
uncertainties regarding future responsibilities within the 
National Programme.
16
 This is of particular concern as it is 
unlikely that organisations that are being encouraged to compete 
with each other will focus attention on interoperability 
without specific incentives of the kind that are being promoted 
in, for example, the US and Canada.
106
 
Given the challenges inherent in contracting on a national 
scale, there is a need to consider the merits of participating 
in the development of open source systems as opposed to the 
purchase of commercially developed systems.
107
 Indeed, the 
resources devoted to the development of Lorenzo Regional Care 
already represent a considerable transfer of intellectual 
property from the NHS. 
Implications for future research 
How national strategy evolves is one issue, but not the only 
one. It clearly remains important to investigate the longer term 
consequences of substantial hospital-wide health records 
systems, taking into account evolving skill levels of users and 
evolving organisational capacity.
103
 There is also a need to 
assess whether once used, NHS Care Records Service software 
systems improve the quality and safety of care, the more 
effective management of resources, the way in which care 
practices are organised and delivered, and professional roles. 
Finally, we identify a pressing need to develop appropriate 
models to inform how best to implement national systems and, in 
particular, to assess whether paying appropriate attention to 
the sociotechnical dimensions of implementation is beneficial at 
promoting successful adoption. 
Conclusions 
The “top down” nature of the national programme has, despite 
ensuring necessary high level leadership and support,
12
 
contributed to a lack of organisational and user involvement in 
decision making. Organisations and users implementing and 
adopting the NHS Care Records Service have coped with these 
challenges in different ways, their responses being influenced 
by the software in question and local arrangements. Despite 
some early benefits, particularly in relation to infrastructure 
and internal capacity development, our results show that 
software systems have as yet had difficulty fulfilling 
organisational and user needs. 
The strategic move towards a more locally autonomous model now 
needs to be balanced with national requirements in terms of 
systems interoperability, shared learning, and implementation 
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approaches. Early international experiences suggest that use of 
such a combination of local and centralised approaches offers 
the best chances of successful implementation and adoption.
108
 
England has attempted to pursue a centralised “top down” 
approach, and there is now a need for international efforts to 
learn from and build on these early experiences. Although our 
work has clearly shown that many users, managers, service 
providers, and implementers have been sorely bruised by the 
first steps in the journey to implement a truly comprehensive 
national electronic health record system, history might—
particularly if the right calls are now made at this important 
juncture—be more forgiving. 
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Table 
Table 1| Summary of recruited hospitals in study of progress of implementation of nationwide electronic health records in secondary care 
in England 
Site 
NHS Care Records Service 
application 
Type of 
hospital Teaching status Foundation status* Location No of beds Annual turnover 
A Cerner Millennium Acute Teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Urban 1000-1499 £800-1000m 
B Lorenzo Regional Care 
(Release 1 and 1.9) 
Acute Non-teaching Foundation (more 
autonomous) 
Rural 1000-1499 £200-399m 
C Lorenzo Regional Care 
(Release 1) 
Acute Teaching Foundation (more 
autonomous) 
Mixed urban 1000-1499 £200-399m 
D Cerner Millennium Acute Non-teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Urban 500-999 £200-399m 
E Cerner Millennium Acute Teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Urban 500-999 £400-599m 
G RiO (4/5) Mental health Teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Urban 500-999 £200-399m 
H Lorenzo Regional Care 
(Release 1) 
Community Non-teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Urban N/A <£200m 
M RiO (5.1) Mental health Teaching Foundation (more 
autonomous) 
Urban Mostly outpatients 
but <500 inpatient 
beds 
<£200m 
P Originally planned to 
implement Cerner Millennium 
Acute Teaching Foundation (more 
autonomous) 
Mixed urban 1000-1499 £400-599m 
Q Lorenzo Regional Care 
(Release 1) 
Mental health Non-teaching Foundation (more 
autonomous) 
Rural Mostly outpatients 
but <500 inpatient 
beds 
<£200m 
R Implemented Cerner 
Millennnium R.0 before 
going back to their patient 
administration system 
Acute Non-teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Mixed urban 500-999 No information 
available, hospital 
recently merged 
X Lorenzo Regional Care 
(Release 1) 
Acute Non-teaching Non-foundation (less 
autonomous) 
Rural <500 <£200m 
 
*Foundation status indicates level of autonomy of NHS organisation (www.monitor-
nhsft.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Guide_for_applicants_Nov2008. pdf). 
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